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Abstract
In July 2016, Vermont became the rst U.S. state to require mandatory labeling of foods containing
genetically engineered (GE) ingredients. The introduction of the Vermont law serves as a quasi-
natural experiment on the economic eects of mandatory GE labeling. We investigate the market
response in the U.S. sugar market. Almost all beet sugar is GE, while cane sugar is GE-free. Prior
to 2016, cane and beet sugar were regarded as homogenous. However, in mid-2016, rened cane
sugar began selling at a premium over rened beet sugar. We nd the mandatory labeling initiative
generated about a 13% price discount for beet sugar and a premium of about 1% for cane. Food
manufacturers' concerns over mandatory labeling caused them to switch inputs. This resulted in a
redistribution of welfare in the U.S. sugar industry.
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Many food companies have decided to label their products as non-GMO. And
because practically all sugar beets in the U.S. are genetically modied, those food
products are now using sugar derived from sugar cane . . . Dan Charles,
National Public Radio (May 12, 2016)
Legislation is not made in a vacuum. Markets evolve even as policy debate transpires, and
markets anticipate policy changes. Once a policy outcome becomes suciently likely, pro-
ducers adjust to minimize costs and maximize benets. But these adjustments can be costly
to reverse even if the policy outcome never comes to pass or is later quashed. Segmentation
of the U.S. sugar market in response to mandatory labeling legislation for food containing
genetically engineered (GE) ingredients is one such example of this phenomenon.1
In May 2014, Vermont became the rst (and only) state to pass mandatory labeling rules
for GE foods sold for consumption at home.2 The law (Act 120) took eect on July 1, 2016,
but was nullied by federal legislation later that month. Penalties and requirements under
the Vermont law were harsh. Consumers could sue for violations of the labeling requirements
without needing to demonstrate any specic damage occurred as a result of the alleged
violation (Bovay and Alston, 2018). Manufacturers of improperly labeled products sold in
Vermont would be ned $1,000 per day, per product.
About two weeks after the Vermont law took eect, U.S. Congress responded with the
National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (NBFDS), which pre-empts state-level
labeling initiatives and imposes federal disclosure requirements for some GE-containing foods
but allows that the disclosure need not be explicit on the product label (Charles, 2016).3 On
May 4, 2018, the USDA released a set of proposed requirements under the NBFDS, including
a statement on the consequences for non-compliance and mechanisms for enforcement (FR,
2018). These rules have not been nalized and are currently subject to public comment.
In spite of the widespread use of food labels worldwide (Carter and Gruère, 2003a; Gruère,
Carter and Farzin, 2009; Kiesel, McCluskey and Villas-Boas, 2011; Van Eenennaam et al.,
2014; Vigani and Olper, 2013), empirical evidence of market impact is scant. Existing re-
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search focuses entirely at the retail level. Kiesel, McCluskey and Villas-Boas (2011) review
literature that uses market-level and natural experiments to examine the eects of nutri-
tional label requirements on consumer behavior. Teisl, Bockstael and Levy (2001) employ
an experiment to study the welfare eects of the provision of nutrition information on super-
market shelves to highlight whether the food product was low or reduced in fat, cholesterol,
sodium, and calories. Berning, Chouinard and McCluskey (2010) and Kiesel and Villas-Boas
(2013) conduct eld experiments to examine the eects of nutrition labels on the sales of
microwave popcorn. Some research has also used scanner data to evaluate consumers' pur-
chasing decisions in the context of GE labeling rules (Chang, 2006; Marks, Kalaitzandonakes
and Vickner, 2004). Gruère (2006) incorporates the behavior of food manufacturers by com-
paring the fraction of food products labeled with information regarding the use of GE inputs
in Canada (where GE labeling is voluntary) and France (where GE labeling is mandatory).
We analyze the eects of GE food labeling laws and associated product reformulation
on the relative prices of GE and non-GE food ingredients. Our analysis focuses on the U.S.
rened sugar market, an interesting case for several reasons. Most importantly, sugar is a
key ingredient in many processed food products; thus, understanding the eects of labeling
laws on the sugar market has broad relevance across a wide range of consumer products.
Sugar also has two distinct GE and non-GE production methods. In the United States,
sugar is produced from both sugarcane and sugarbeets. Sugarcane stalks are milled to
produce raw sugar. Raw cane sugar is then sent to a rening facility to be transformed into
rened sugar. Sugbarbeets, in contrast, have no raw stage; they are processed from beet
to rened sugar in one continuous process. The U.S. market share for beet (cane) sugar is
approximately 58% (42%). Almost all U.S. sugarbeet production is GE, while cane sugar
is GE-free. However, sugar derived from beets is chemically identical to sugar derived from
cane (Klein, Altenbuchner and Mattes, 1998).
Finally, regulations in the U.S. sugar market create a relatively clean setting in which
to identify the impacts of labeling requirements. U.S. cane and beet growers receive annual
2
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marketing allotments (i.e., production quotas) and all imports are subject to tari-rate
quotas or volumetric restrictions. Imported sugar accounts for about 25% of the U.S. supply,
and all imports are cane sugar.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Since early 2016, rened cane sugar has traded at an unusual price premium of up to
7.9¢ per lb. (27%) over rened beet sugar. Figure 1 shows rened cane and beet prices from
January 2008 to December 2017. Prices historically moved in a close one-to-one relationship.
From January 2008 to December 2015, the maximum dierence between cane and beet prices
was just 2¢ per lb.
We ask two questions related to the relationship between GE labeling laws and market
segmentation in the U.S. sugar industry. The rst question is one of attributioncan the
divergence in U.S. cane and beet prices be attributed to input reformulation in response to the
Vermont labeling initiative? A structural break analysis reveals that the breakdown in the
relationship between cane and beet prices occurred in the MayJuly 2016 period. July 2016
is the month Vermont's mandatory labeling law took eect. Historical price relationships
before and after July 2016 reveal that the locus of the break was at the rener level and the
shock was conned to the U.S. market. It seems clear that food manufacturers responded to
the Vermont legislation by changing their input mix.
The second question is one of impactif labeling requirements caused the price diver-
gence, what would rened sugar prices have been in the absence of such legislation? Using a
standard regime-switching regression model, we nd that the Vermont law induced a break in
the price relationship between U.S. and world sugar prices. This price premium has persisted
under the NBFDS. Relative to what prices would have been in the absence of legislationGE
labeling requirements generated an average premium for cane sugar of approximately 1% and
a discount for beet sugar of around 13%. In the 12-month period immediately following the
July 2016 legislation, mandatory GE labeling requirements generated a $40 million windfall
for U.S. cane reners and cost U.S. beet processors approximately $400 million.
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Economics of GE Food Labeling Laws & Input Mix
Economists have studied the drivers and international dierences in GE labeling requirements
(Carter and Gruère, 2003a; Gruère, Carter and Farzin, 2009; McCluskey, Wesseler and Win-
free, 2018; Vigani and Olper, 2013) and the impact of mandatory labels on consumer and
producer behavior. From the consumer perspective, mandatory GE labels function both as
a sorting mechanism for consumers (Crespi and Marette, 2003; Fulton and Giannakas, 2004)
and as a signal about the relative safety of GE foods (Artuso, 2003; Lusk and Rozan, 2008).
The consumer impacts and potential price dierences between GE and non-GE ingredients
also aect manufacturers' input and supply decisions (Carter and Gruère, 2003b).
Firm-level Decision
The introduction of the Vermont law forced manufacturers to make a binary choice: (1)
maintain current product formulation and label or (2) switch to non-GE inputs to avoid
labeling. The prot-maximizing strategy is a function of the share of consumers willing to
buy GE-labeled foods, the cost of switching from GE- to non-GE inputs, and the cost of
compliance with the labeling policy (Carter and Gruère, 2003b). Consumers may interpret a
mandatory label as a warning that GE foods pose a food safety threat or are of poor quality.
If so, some consumers previously unwilling to pay a premium for non-GE may pay to avoid
GE as a result of the policy. Moreover, for most food products reformulation towards non-
GE inputs is unlikely to have a substantial eect on the nal food price. GE ingredients are
typically used in highly processed products and represent a small share of the food dollar
(Cowan, 2010). These factors push the food manufacturer to convert to non-GE inputs to
avoid labeling.
A similar choice exists for retailers (Kalaitzandonakes and Bijman, 2003). For example,
supermarkets like Trader Joe's, Whole Foods, and many others seek to dierentiate them-
selves by oering foods perceived by consumers as higher quality. If consumers perceive
4
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foods containing GE products as lower quality due to a label, retailers may choose not to
oer them (Carter et al., 2012; Van Eenennaam et al., 2014).
The reformulation decision was not exclusive to suppliers selling into Vermont. One can
easily imagine the following circumstances: a food manufacturer labels food in compliance
with one state's law, but a retailer (perhaps accidentally) sells the product in Vermont where
the label is non-compliant with local law. The food manufacturer would be liable and subject
to penalties under the Vermont law. Furthermore, economies of scale may incentivize the
food manufacturer to use only one input. Most food manufacturers supply several states
out of a single production facility. So, even if a small share of the market requires labeling,
the product requirement may change the entire supply chain. The history of litigation over
labeling rules suggests the cost of adhering to mandatory labeling could be high.4
The passage of the NBFDS is not an emancipation for food manufacturers (or retailers)
who already reformulated in light of the Vermont law. On one hand, the NBFDS is not (in the
strict sense) a mandatory labeling policy. The limited disclosure requirements may reduce
the incentive to reformulate (Bovay and Alston, 2018). On the other hand, the decision to
convert from GE- to non-GE ingredients is not the dual of the decision to convert back. Once
the decision to convert to non-GE ingredients is made, it is somewhat irreversible. If GE
products are perceived as being of lower quality than their non-GE counterparts (regardless of
whether this perception is inuenced by labeling legislation), the decision to reformulate away
from GE ingredients and towards non-GE ingredients sends a message of quality upgrading
to consumersa source of dierentiation from competitors. For a manufacturer who has
already reformulated to non-GE inputs, the decision to convert back to GE ingredients
sends a message of quality downgrading. The move would open the manufacturer to loss of
market share. The switch back to GE ingredients would not necessarily lead to a signicant
cost saving for many food products. The relative silence in the economics literature on
quality downgrading is telling on this point. Additionally, manufacturers considering a move
back to GE ingredients may face substantial political backlash by pressure groups opposed
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to GE technology. The uncertainty with respect to the specic requirements of the NBFDS
reinforce these points for risk-averse manufacturers.
Market-level Outcomes
To see how markets have responded to potential mandatory labeling, we turn to the sugar
industry. In late 2015 and early 2016, many food manufacturers, including Campbell Soup,
ConAgra, General Mills, Hershey, Kellogg's, and others, announced they would switch to
sourcing sugar from cane rather than beets (Perez, 2016). Several explicitly cited the Ver-
mont legislation and the absence of a federal labeling bill as the primary driver behind
this decision (Clayton, 2016; Meersman, 2015). Following these announcements, the close
historical relationship between rened cane and beet prices began to deteriorate (gure 1).
This breakdown in the price relationship is consistent with the theoretical eects of
mandatory labeling laws on input markets. Figure 2 presents a simple conceptual model of
the U.S. sugar market. Segments SBeet and SCane in panels (a) and (b) of gure 2, respec-
tively, represent the supply schedules for rened beet and cane sugar produced domestically.
Marketing allotments under the U.S. sugar program make supply highly inelastic at a certain
quantity for both products.
[Figure 2 about here.]
Prior to the promulgation of a mandatory labeling law, cane and beet sugar were treated
as a homogenous commodity. Thus, the total supply of domestically produced rened sugar
in the U.S. (SSugar) in panel (c) was the horizontal sum of SBeet and SCane. Schedule DSugar
also shown in panel (c) depicts the residual demand for rened sugar (net of TRQ and
Mexican imports) by U.S. food manufacturers and other sugar users. Equilibrium occurs
where market demand for sugar equals market supply, shown by the intersection of schedules
SSugar and DSugar in panel (c). In this equilibrium, QSugar units of sugar were sold, QBeet of
which were derived from beets and QCane of which were derived from cane (where QBeet +
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QCane = QSugar). All sugar was sold at price Pf .
Enactment of a mandatory labeling law segmented the demand schedule for rened sugar.
A portion of the market, including food manufacturers who reformulate towards non-GE,
was now willing to pay a premium to purchase sugar derived from cane. Demand for GE-
free cane sugar is depicted as schedule DGE−free in panel (b). Those who do not reformulate
or are unwilling to pay a premium for cane will continue to source from beet (depicted as
schedule DBeet in panel (a)).
Under a mandatory labeling policy, equilibrium occurs when the demand for GE-free
sugar is equal to the supply of cane sugar and the demand for sugar users unwilling to pay
a premium aligns with the supply of beet sugar. In gure 2, this equilibrium is represented
by the intersection of schedules DGE−free and SCane in panel (b) and the intersection of
schedules DBeet and SBeet in panel (a).
The law drives a wedge between the price of non-GE and GE inputs. Processors of non-
GE inputs receive a premium for their products, while processors of GE inputs receive lower
prices. The premium to cane reners is PCane − Pf and the discount to beet processors is
Pf −PBeet. The policy results in transfers of economic welfare away from beet processors and
towards cane reners. The total windfall to cane reners is (PCane − Pf )QCane. The total
loss to beet processors is (Pf − PBeet)QBeet. The introduction of GE labeling requirements
also results in a deadweight loss equal to the sum of triangle k in panel (a) and triangle j in
panel (b).
Methodology & Preliminary Analysis
In this section, we examine whether the theoretical and anecdotal evidence regarding the
relationship between GE labeling laws and U.S. sugar prices is supported by empirics. We
rst use a structural break test to determine whether the timing of the break in cane rel-
ative to beet prices is consistent with the legislative and policy timeline. We then use a
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regime-switching regression model to measure the historical relationship between U.S. and
world rened sugar prices prior to the observed break. Finally, we compare pre- and post-
structural-break prices for rened sugar to measure the eects of the labeling legislation.
Model robustness and sensitivity are considered in Section 5.
Our data includes monthly observations of U.S. raw and rened cane sugar, rened beet
sugar, and world raw and rened sugar prices from January 2011 to December 2017. The
U.S. raw cane price is the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) Sugar No. 16 nearby futures
contract.5 The world raw price is the nearby price for the ICE No. 11 contract.6 There is no
futures market for rened sugar in the United States. We use the average monthly spot price
for rened cane sugar and the average monthly spot price for rened beet sugar published
by the Milling & Baking Magazine.7 The world rened price is the nearby price for the ICE
No. 5 London Daily futures contract for white (i.e., rened) sugar free-on-board in Europe.8
Deliveries under the London No. 5 contract can be either rened beet or cane sugar.
The start date is purposefully chosen as January 2011 to limit the analysis to the rel-
evant market environment. The volume of Mexican sugar exports to the U.S. increased
substantially in FY2011 and has remained high since then (USITC, 2015). This change in
export volumes likely aected the relationship between U.S. and world prices, on which our
regression analysis hinges.
Table 1 presents Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test statistics for monthly U.S. and
world sugar prices from Jan-2011 to Dec-2017 (Dickey and Fuller, 1979). The third column
reports the corresponding MacKinnon approximate p-value. As shown in table 1, we fail to
reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for all price series. In other words, U.S. and
world sugar prices follow a random walk.
[Table 1 about here.]
Under U.S. sugar policy, all sugar imports are subject to volumetric restrictions and all
U.S. production is subject to marketing quotas. In this setting, it is unlikely that shocks
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to the world market would be fully passed through to the U.S. market (and vice versa). A
preliminary question is whether U.S. and world sugar prices move together in this policy
environment. To formally test whether U.S. prices and world prices are cointegrated, we
construct a vector-error correction model (Engle and Granger, 1987). To verify that rened
cane and beet sugar prices were cointegrated prior to the introduction of the mandatory
labeling law, we measure the cointegrating relationship between Jan. 2011Dec. 2015. We
remove later periods because they are potentially aected by the mandatory labeling require-
ments. The analysis indicates a statistically signicant long-run cointegration relationship
between all three price series (results are reported in table 2). Prior to the imposition of GE
labeling laws, U.S. cane and beet rened sugar prices were cointegrated with each other and
each series was cointegrated with world rened prices at the 99% level of condence.
[Table 2 about here.]
Structural Break Analysis
An important step in our analysis is to determine when the breakdown in the cointegrating
relationship between monthly U.S. rened cane and beet prices occurred. We estimate the
following equation over the entire sample period:
(1) P ct = α + βP
b
t + et
Variable P ct represents the U.S. price for rened cane sugar at time t and P
b
t is the corre-
sponding U.S. price for rened beet sugar. We consider Supremum Wald and Likelihood
Ratio (L.R.) tests for a structural break at an unknown break date using a symmetric, 15%
sample trim (Andrews, 1993; Kim and Siegmund, 1989; Quandt, 1960). We conduct the
analysis with variables specied in both levels and natural logarithmic form.
[Table 3 about here.]
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Table 3 reports the results of the structural break tests. All tests reject the hypothesis of
no structural break with 99.99% condence. The Wald tests identify July 2016the month
the Vermont GE Labeling Law took eect and the NBFDS was enactedas the most likely
date when the structural break occurred. The Likelihood Ratio tests identify the break date
two months earlier, in May 2016.
Figure 4 plots Wald and L.R. statistics for each candidate break date for the specication
in logs. The two tests are generally consistent. July 2016 is the most likely date for the break
in the Wald specication and the second-most-likely date in the L.R. specication. Similarly,
May 2016 is the most likely date for the break in the L.R. specication and the second-most-
likely in the Wald specication. Interestingly, the gure shows a substantial increase in the
both the Wald and L.R. statistic for May 2014the month the Vermont Labeling Law was
passed.
[Figure 3 about here.]
These ndings strongly support the conclusion that the break in sugar prices was the
result of the GE labeling initiatives. Food manufacturers faced with the pending Vermont
legislation (and other state laws on the horizon) initially waited to convert to GE-free ingre-
dients in hopes that Federal legislation would invalidate mandatory labeling rules. When the
Vermont law became imminent, food intermediaries reformulated away from GE ingredients
(beet sugar) towards non-GE ingredients (cane sugar), resulting in a price premium for cane
and a discount for beet.
There is still the possibility that the timing of the GE labeling legislation and the price
divergence could have been coincidental. For example, the breakdown in the cane-to-beet
cointegrating relationship could have been caused by non-U.S.-centric factors or issues unique
to the U.S. but occurring elsewhere along the sugar supply chain. To conclusively attribute
the cane-to-beet price break to mandatory labeling requirements, one must consider these
alternative explanations. For clarity and brevity, we focus on the July 2016 candidate break
in the analysis that follows. We have conducted a corresponding analysis for the May 2016
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candidate break. Because the dierence involves only two data points from a much larger
sample, point estimates between the two breakpoints are virtually identical for all analyses
that we have conducted. All ndings and discussion that follow are robust to the use of the
May 2016 break date.
Table 4 reports the correlation between U.S. and world sugar prices (again in natural
logarithmic form) prior to and after July 2016. As shown in Column 1, the U.S. rened cane
price and the U.S. rened beet price had a correlation of 1.00 prior to July 2016. In other
words, a shock to the cane price was fully transmitted to the beet price, and vice versa. The
prices were perfectly co-integrated. However, following the July 2016 break, the correlation
between the two price series fell to 0.57, indicating a breakdown in the relationship.
[Table 4 about here.]
Within the U.S. market, the July 2016 break appears to have been isolated to rened
sugar. Turning to row 2 of table 4, the correlation between the U.S. rened cane price and
the U.S. raw cane price fell from 0.96 to -0.12 following the break. The correlation between
U.S. rened beet and U.S. raw cane went from being highly positive (0.95) to highly negative
(-0.74). These pre- and post-July 2016 correlations for rened-to-raw sugar have important
implications for the distributional impacts of the policy. As noted in the Introduction,
sugarcane is rst processed into raw sugar and then sent to reners for further processing
into rened sugar. In contrast, sugar produced from sugarbeets does not have a raw stage;
processing is a single, continuous process from beet to rened sugar. The fact that the
price impact does not appear to have been transmitted to the raw stage of cane production
suggests thatover the period of analysis any benets of the policy were most captured by
cane reners. The world market did not experience a divergence in the relationship between
raw (cane) sugar prices and the price for rened sugar (which may be lled with either cane
or beet sugar) in July 2016. As shown in the nal two columns of table 4, the correlation
between world raw and rened sugar prices was 0.99 before July 2016 and 0.98 afterward.
The locus of the shock is the U.S. rened sugar market.
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Price Impact
We now turn to the question of impactwhat would U.S. rened sugar prices have been in
the absence of GE labeling legislation? We treat the introduction of Vermont's GE labeling
law as a quasi-natural experiment making use of two ndings from the previous section to
identify impact: First, U.S. sugar prices were highly correlated with world sugar prices prior
to the law taking eect (rows 3 and 4 of table 4). Second, world prices were unaected by
the Vermont law (columns 7 and 8 of table 4). Taken together these factors suggest that
world sugar prices constitute an almost-ideal control against which to assess the eects of
the Vermont law.
One method by which to identify the treatment eects of a mandatory labeling law would
be an experimental design. Kiesel and Villas-Boas (2013), for example, use a dierence-in-
dierence (DD) model to identify the eects of mandatory nutrition labeling on consumer
behavior. However, such an approach requires strict assumptions. One of these assumptions,
known as the parallel trends assumption, requires thatin the absence of treatmentthe
average outcomes for the treated and control groups would have followed parallel trends over
time (Abadie, 2005). The time-series properties of our data and the restrictive U.S. policy
environment suggest that our setting fails to meet this assumption.9
Rather than a pure experimental approach, we construct a standard regime-switching
model to compare the historically observed relationship between U.S. and world rened
sugar prices prior to the introduction of the Vermont GE Labeling Law with the observed
relationship on and after July 2016. In contrast to the DD design, the regime-switching
model only requires that U.S. and world prices were correlated prior to July 2016 and that
world prices were unaected by U.S. labeling requirements. We assess the impact of GE
food labeling legislation by comparing the price series for U.S. rened cane and beet sugar
implied by the pre- and post-legislation coecient estimates. We estimate the following
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regime-switching model:
(2) Pt = α + δλt + (1− λt)βwt + γλtwt + εt
from Jan-2011 to Dec-2017, where P is, alternatively, the U.S. rened cane sugar price and
the U.S. rened beet sugar price. Subscript t denotes time. Variable w represents the ICE
No. 5 white sugar price (i.e., the world rened sugar price). All prices are monthly and
are specied in natural logarithmic form. Variable λ is an indicator variable equal to unity
in periods on and after July 2016, and equal to zero otherwise. Parameters α, δ, β, γ, ε are
estimated. Alternative models and specications are considered in Section 5.
Results from the regime-switching regression model for beet and cane prices, respectively,
are shown in columns (1) and (2) of table 5. Comparing results across columns, we see that
the coecient on the pre-labeling-law world price is identical for U.S. beet and cane prices
(0.84) and statistically signicant at 99% condence. This result is as expected: prior to the
introduction of the law, U.S. cane and beet prices tracked closely with each other and with
world prices. The results in table 5 lend credence to our decision not to use a DD estimation
approach. Even prior to July 2016, U.S. and world prices did not follow a parallel trend.
Wald tests reject the restriction that β = 1 for both the cane and beet equations.
[Table 5 about here.]
In both equations, the Vermont law appears to have had two eects on U.S.-world price
relationships. First, it drove a wedge between U.S. and world prices (shown by variable
GE Law), and, second, it reduced the U.S.-world price-cointegrating relationship (shown
by variable Post-Law*World Ref. Price). Each result is independently signicant at the
99% level.
These eects are also jointly statistically signicant. Table 6 reports the results of several
post-estimation Wald tests. For both the cane series and the beet series, we reject the joint
hypothesis that there was no price wedge and that the U.S.-world cointegrating relationship
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was unchanged following the introduction of the law (i.e., δ = 0, γ = β). Similarly, for each
equation, we reject with 99% condence the hypothesis that the U.S.-world cointegrating
relationship was the same prior to and following the introduction of the Vermont Law (i.e.,
δ = β).
[Table 6 about here.]
These ndings are entirely consistent with the theoretical eects of mandatory GE label-
ing. First, the law induces a price premium (or discount) for non-GE (GE) products relative
to what the price would have been in the absence of the legislation. Second, GE and non-
GE products are no longer interchangeable in regions that are de facto subjects to labeling
requirements. Thus, such laws reduce integration with external markets that continue to
treat the GE and non-GE products as homogenous.
The total impact of the Vermont labeling law on U.S. rened sugar prices is the aggregate
eect from the two forces discussed above. We estimate this impact for the 12-month period
immediately following the structural break using the pre- and post-structural-break coe-
cient estimates from table 5. The counterfactual estimate (CF) for what U.S. rened sugar
prices would have been had the Vermont Law not taken eect is calculated as CFt = α̂+β̂∗wt.
Post-regime beet and cane prices are calculated as P̂t = α̂ + δ̂ + γ̂ ∗ wt.10
[Figure 4 about here.]
Constructed CF and Post-law-regime prices series are shown in logs in gure 4 and
summarized in levels in table 7. Our estimation suggests that, in the absence of GE labeling
legislation, the average U.S. rened sugar price would have been approximately 35.38¢ per
lb. Over the same period, we derive an actual post-regime average price of 35.03¢ per
lb. for cane sugar and 30.54¢ per lb. for beet sugar. A comparison of counterfactual and
post-regime prices suggests that the legislation reduced beet prices by approximately 12.8%
over the period and raised cane prices by 1.0%.
[Table 7 about here.]
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Implications for Producer Welfare
We now turn to a discussion of the implications for producer welfare. To evaluate the revenue
impacts of mandatory labeling initiatives on U.S. cane reners and beet processors (shown in
Figure 2 as (PCane−Pf )QCane and (Pf−PBeet)QBeet, respectively), we calculate gross receipts
as the product of observed domestic deliveries and actual versus counterfactual prices.11
Note that this welfare measure may misstate welfare impacts if sugar processors re-
sponded to changes in sugar prices by adjusting marketings. For example, one could imagine
that, in light of falling domestic beet prices, U.S. beet processors may have responded by
shifting away from the domestic market towards markets abroad, increased storage vol-
umes, or deliveries for non-human consumption (e.g., ethanol reneries). Aspects of the U.S.
sugar program makes such adjustments extremely unlikely. The USDA administers mar-
keting allotments (i.e., production quotas) to U.S. processors and other import restrictions
for international suppliers. These supply constraints drive U.S. prices above world prices,
andeven in light of falling pricesthe domestic market is much more attractive than the
export market. Moreover, marketing allotments reduce the incentive to store excess sugar
because sugar stored today must compete with future production to meet quota restrictions.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 compares monthly domestic deliveries from July 2016June 2017 (the 12-month
period after the structural break) with the domestic deliveries for the same months in the
previous year. As one would expect given the supply constraints under the U.S. sugar
program, there appears to be no appreciable dierence in domestic cane deliveries in the
2016/17 period relative to the 2015/16 period (in Panel (b) of gure 5). On the other
hand, beet deliveries in Panel (a) of gure 5 appear to have expanded in the 2016/17 period
relative to 2015/16. The increase in domestic deliveries is dueat least in partto favorable
weather conditions and higher-than-expected yields (ERS, 2017). However, if (counter to
expectations) some portion of the expansion in beet deliveries is the result of the breakdown
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in the co-integrating price relationship, implications are twofold.
First, the use of observed domestic deliveries to calculate gross receipts represents a lower
bound for the estimated costs of GE labeling laws on U.S. beet processors. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, the extent to which the cane-to-beet price wedge is permanent
is an open question. If U.S. beet processors, faced with falling beet prices, chose to increase
deliveries as opposed to increasing temporary storage, it may imply that beet processors
regard the price wedge as permanent.
Post-Vermont regime and counterfactual monthly gross receipts for U.S. cane and beet
processors are reported in table 8. Over the 12-month period after the Vermont GE labeling
law took eect, mandatory labeling requirements have cost U.S. beet processors approxi-
mately $435 million. Yet the premium created for non-GE food ingredients has not resulted
in a symmetric windfall. The U.S. cane sector gained only about $40 million as a result of
the law. Note also the nding in Section 3.1 that the raw-to-rened price relationship broke
down after July 2016. This suggests that the $40 million likely was received by cane reners,
and was not passed on to growers in the form of higher cane prices.
[Table 8 about here.]
The substantial imbalance between the losses to beet processors and the gains to cane
reners is only partically connected to the deadweight loss of GE labeling requirements.
Losses to beet processors are in part oset by a gain to food manufacturers purchasing beet
sugar. Likewise, the gain to cane reners is oset in part by a loss to food manufacturers
purchasing cane sugar. Lower costs to GE products may also be passed through to consumers
in the form of lower food prices. The magnitude of these osetsand in turn the deadweight
lossis dependent on the elasticities of demand in each market.
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Robustness and Sensitivity
In this section, we use alternative specications to examine the robustness of our model.
We consider the inclusion of alternative and additional controls, the possible existence of
confounding factors, and the implications of our time-series data. The percentage impact
of Vermont labeling requirements on U.S. rened sugar prices implied by these alternative
specications ranges from 1% to 13% for cane and -10% to -16% for beet.
Columns (1) and (2) of table 9 present the results from re-estimating the regime-switching
model shown in equation 2 using the world raw price as the control variable rather than the
world rened price. Consistent with the ndings in table 5, the Vermont law drives a wedge
between U.S. and world prices and reduces the level of integration between the two markets.
These results imply a price impact that is nearly identical to that discussed above for both
cane and beet prices. This is not surprising because world raw and rened sugar prices are
almost perfectly correlated over the sample period (table 4).
[Table 9 about here.]
Next, we consider confounding factors. Beginning in January 2011, Mexican sugar ex-
ports to the U.S. increased substantially. This surge in imports gave rise to antidumping and
countervailing duty (ADCVD) proceedings, which, in December 2015, culminated in volu-
metric and price restrictions on Mexican sugar exports to the United States (USITC, 2015).
Carter, Saitone and Schaefer (2017) nd that these restrictions impacted the U.S.-world price
relationship. We control for this by including an indicator variable in the regime-switching
model equal to unity for all time periods after December 2015 (and zero otherwise). The
world price is again the world rened price. Estimation results for this specication are
reported in Columns (3) and (4) of table 9. Coecient estimates imply the Vermont law
reduced beet prices by 16% and increased cane prices by 13%.
Another potential estimation issue relates to the time-series properties of our data. Spu-
rious correlation caused by non-stationarity in our data could lead to incorrect inference.
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The risk of spurious correlation is low in this setting because of the commodity nature of
sugarmarket prices move together. However, for the sake of robustness, we correct for
non-stationarity via rst-dierence estimation.
[Table 10 about here.]
Results from re-estimating equation 2 in rst dierences are reported in Columns (1)
and (2) of table 10, respectively, for beet and cane prices. First-dierencing substantially
reduces the precision of our estimates, but ndings are unchanged in substance. Turning
rst to Column (1), the GE law drives a 2% (positive) wedge between U.S. beet and world
rened prices. Coecients on rst-dierenced world prices are insignicant. The point
estimate falls from 0.015 to 0.003. Combining the two eects implies a 10% reduction in
U.S. rened beet prices as a result of the Vermont Law. Cane results in Column (2) show a
1.7% increase in Cane prices as a result of the Labeling Law. Coecients on world rened
prices are signicant at 99% both before and after the imposition of the law, but the post-law
coecient is not signicantly dierent from the pre-law coecient. In Columns (3) and (4),
we add the indicator variable that controls for the imposition of the U.S.-Mexico ADCVD
suspension agreements. Results are similar to those in Columns (1) and (2) and imply a
9.8% reduction in beet prices and a small (≈ 1%) increase in cane prices as a result of the
law.
Conclusion
In the United States, a push for mandatory labeling of GE foods began in Oregon, California,
and Washington and rippled through at least one-half of all U.S. states. In many ways, Ver-
mont Act 120, which passed in May 2014 and took eect in July 2016, was the culmination
of those eorts. The law required that (with a few exemptions) foods containing GE ingre-
dients sold for home consumption be labeled. The law also established harsh penalties for
food manufacturers found to be in violation of labeling requirements. Congress responded
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soon after the Vermont law took eect with the successful promulgation of the National
Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard (NBFDS). The NBFDS nullies all state-level at-
tempts to establish mandatory labeling rules and, instead, imposes disclosure requirements
at the federal level. Many aspects of the NBFDS are currently subject to public comment
and remain to be nalized.
In the period surrounding the implementation of Vermont Act 120, commodity markets
responded. In this research, we investigate the response in the U.S. sugar market. In mid-
2016, rened cane sugar began selling at a substantial premium over rened beet sugar. Our
analysis supports the explanation that the divergence in U.S. prices for rened cane and beet
sugar was the result of Vermont's mandatory GE labeling. The divergence occurred on or
around July 2016the month the Vermont Act took eect.
Counterfactual price estimates generated by a regression model suggest that GE food
labeling initiatives generated a small premium for cane sugar and a price discount for beet
sugar of approximately 13% relative to what prices would have been in the absence of such
legislation. An open question is whether the new cane-to-beet price wedge is permanent or,
alternatively, whether prices will converge again once the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) has oered nal guidance on NBFDS compliance. Increased domestic deliveries by
U.S. beet processors in the face of falling beet prices suggests that growers believe the price
wedge may be permanent. Implications extend beyond the U.S. sugar industry to other
ingredients containing GE.
We stress that our estimates are only a partial measure of the welfare eects of the
Vermont law. Our results should also be regarded as short-run estimates of the producer
welfare impacts. We do not consider downstream or long-run implications of the legislation.
In the future, producers may lobby for changes to quota allotments or other aspects of U.S.
sugar policy to mitigate the impacts of labeling policies. New technologies, such as the GE
sugarcane varieties currently being testing in Brazil (Mano, 2017), may also alter future
returns to GE versus non-GE foods in the U.S. and abroad.
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Finally, to understand the full eects of the legislation one would need to formally incor-
porate the consumer benets (or costs) of the policy. However, we believe the consumer-level
eects are likely to be smallat least in the short runin the current context. We cite two
primary reasons for this belief: First, because sugar prices represent a small share of the nal
food dollar for processed foods, a change in the relative prices of GE and non-GE ingredi-
ents, is unlikely to have a substantial eect on food prices. Second, the results documented
here are unlikely to result in substantial information to the consumer. At the retail level,
the regime change is not one from the absence of labels to the presence of labels. Prior to
the implementation of the Vermont law, products featuring GE-free and organic labels were
readily available.
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Notes
1GE technology is dened here as in Van Eenennaam et al. (2014):
Genetic engineering (GE) can be dened as the manipulation of an organism's genes by in-
troducing, eliminating, or rearranging specic genes using the methods of modern molecular
biology, particularly those techniques referred to as recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA)
techniques.
2 Exempted from labeling requirements were alcohol, food served in restaurants, ready-to-eat foods, foods
derived from animals raised with GE feed, and foods manufactured with GE processing aids, such as enzymes
(Bovay and Alston, 2018).
3 Food manufacturers can use a text statement, a symbol, or the words scan here for more food infor-
mation accompanied by a QR code that can be read by a smartphone. Small manufacturers may print a
website URL or phone number that customers can call for more information (FR, 2018).
4 For example, in 1986, California passed Proposition 65a referendum requiring businesses to provide
a warning about chemicals contained in their products. Similar to Vermont's labeling law, Proposition 65
contains a provision allowing private citizens to le lawsuits against businesses alleging violations of warning
requirements. Between 2000 and 2016, businesses paid over $280 million to settle Proposition 65 cases
initiated by private citizens (OAG, 2016).
5 Monthly prices obtained from table 4 of the ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook. Nearby refers to
the contract with the closest settlement date. The ICE No. 16 contract species that 112,000 pounds of raw
cane sugar be physically delivered to one of ve U.S. renery ports: New York, Baltimore, Galveston, New
Orleans, or Savannah. Delivery months are January, March, May, July, September, and November.
6 Monthly prices obtained from table 3b of the ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook. The No. 11 contract
species delivery of 112,000 pounds of raw cane sugar in delivery months March, May, July, and October.
Delivery on the No. 11 contract occurs at a port in the country of origin free-on-board on the receiver's
vessel. Delivery can originate in about 30 dierent countries, including Australia, Brazil, Costa Rica, and
South Africa.
7 Monthly prices obtained from table 5 and 5a of the ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook. Prices are
the simple average of the lower end of the range of quotations from Milling & Baking News for days in each
month.
8 Monthly prices obtained from table 2 of the ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook.
9 We note that the synthetic control method does not require the parallel trend assumption. Instead, it
uses a comparator constructed as a weighted average of all available control units (Abadie, Diamond and
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Hainmueller, 2010). The weights are chosen to ensure that, prior to the intervention, levels of covariates and
outcomes are similar over time to those of the treated unit. This method is unnecessary here because we
rely on a singlebut well-chosencontrol: the world sugar price.
10 Note that we have actual observations for post-regime beet and cane prices. We use our predicted
estimates instead of actual prices to isolate the impact of Vermont law. A variety of demand and supply
factors not related to the Vermont law can impact U.S. and world prices in any given month. By focusing
on the average relationship over time, we eliminate (or at least substantially reduce) the biases created by
these extraneous factors.
11 Data on domestic cane and beet deliveries by U.S. processors are obtained from table 19 of the ERS
Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook.
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Figure 1: U.S. rened sugarcane and sugarbeet prices
Note: U.S. rened beet and cane prices are obtained from table 5 and 5a of the ERS Sugar & Sweeteners
Report. Table 5 is available online at
https://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/sugar-and-sweeteners-yearbook-tables.aspx; table 5a is not
online, but is available from ERS upon request. Underlying data are the simple average of the lower end of
the range of quotations from Milling & Baking News for days in each month.
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Figure 2: Impact of GE food labeling laws on U.S. sugar market
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Figure 3: Tests for break in U.S. beet-cane price relationship
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Figure 4: Counterfactual price forecast
Note: Condence intervals for GE-law-regime price series are constructed using the Bayesian Bootstrap
method with 1,000 draws from the posterior distribution for each parameter estimate from Columns (1)
and (2) of table 5.
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Figure 5: Domestic cane and beet deliveries
Note: Domestic cane and beet deliveries obtained from ERS Sugar and Sweeteners Yearbook table 19.
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Stationarity
Log Price Series Obs. Test-Statistic P-Value Conclusion
U.S. Rened (Cane) 83 -1.775 0.39 Fail to reject non-stationarity
U.S. Rened (Beet) 83 -1.883 0.34 Fail to reject non-stationarity
World Rened 83 -1.90 0.33 Fail to reject non-stationarity
World Raw (Cane) 83 -2.31 0.29 Fail to reject non-stationarity
Note: All prices are monthly averages and are specied in natural logarithmic form.
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Table 2: VECM Cointegration Results (Jan 2011Dec 2015)
Series Obs. χ2 P-value Conclusion
Cane; Beet 58 2688.647 0.00 Cointegrated
Cane; World 58 6.872 0.01 Cointegrated
Beet; World 58 6.769 0.01 Cointegrated
Note: All prices are monthly averages and are specied
in natural logarithmic form.
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Table 3: Structural Break Test
Specication Estimated Break Sup. Wald P-Value Obs.
Wald Levels Jul-2016 142.97 0.0000 84
Wald Logs Jul-2016 154.91 0.0000 84
L.R. Levels May-2016 119.34 0.0000 84
L.R. Logs May-2016 127.66 0.0000 84
Note: Trimmed sample runs from Feb. 2012Dec. 2016 (15% trim)
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Table 4: Price Correlation Matrix Pre- and Post-July 2016
U.S.
Ref. Cane
U.S.
Ref. Beet
US
Raw Cane
World
Raw Cane
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
U.S. Ref. Beet 1.00 0.57
U.S. Raw Cane 0.96 -0.12 0.95 -0.74
World Raw Cane 0.75 -0.65 0.72 -0.83 0.72 0.71
World Rened 0.74 -0.61 0.71 -0.91 0.71 0.76 0.99 0.98
Note: All prices in natural logarithmic form.
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Table 5: U.S.-World Sugar Price Relationships, Pre- and Post-Vermont GE Labeling Law
VARIABLES
(1)
Log U.S.
Ref. Beet Price
(2)
Log U.S.
Ref. Cane Price
Constant (α) 0.96*** 1.01***
(0.28) (0.26)
GE Law (δ) 3.63*** 3.00***
(0.31) (0.28)
Pre-Law*World Ref. Price (β) 0.84*** 0.84***
(0.09) (0.08)
Post-Law*World Ref. Price (γ) -0.39*** -0.15***
(0.04) (0.04)
Observations 84 84
R-squared 0.56 0.55
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Post-Estimation Wald Tests
U.S. Ref. Beet Price U.S. Ref. Cane Price
Null Hypothesis Wald Statistic P-Value Wald Statistic P-Value
δ=0 134.43 0.000 113.65 0.000
γ=β 137.02 0.000 68.23 0.000
δ=0, γ=β 155.33 0.000 121.35 0.000
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Table 7: Impact of GE food Labeling Laws on U.S. Sugar Prices
Rened Price Series Average Price: Impact of
Jul-16Dec-17 Labeling Laws
(¢ per lb.) (% Change)
U.S. Cane 35.38 1.0
(3.49)
U.S. Beet 30.54 -21.7
(1.26)
Counterfactual 35.03
(3.49)
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 8: U.S. Sugar Industry Gross Receipts (GE-Law vs. No Law Scenario)
Gross Receipts, July `16June `17
Deliveries GE Law No Law Dierence
(1,000 STRV) (Million Dollars)
Beet 5,188 $2,961.56 $3,396.97 -$435.40
Cane 6,187 $4,091.25 $4,050.77 $40.48
Note: Gross receipts are obtained by multiplying GE-Law
& No-Law prices by domestic deliveries (1.07 raw-to-rened
conversion rate).
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Table 9: Robustness: Alternative Controls and Confounding Factors
VARIABLES
(1)
Log U.S.
Ref. Beet Price
(2)
Log U.S.
Ref. Cane Price
(3)
Log U.S.
Ref. Beet Price
(4)
Log U.S.
Ref. Cane Price
GE Law 2.890*** 2.453*** 4.286*** 3.691***
(0.288) (0.247) (0.410) (0.362)
Pre-Law*World Price 0.733*** 0.723*** 1.101*** 1.107***
(0.082) (0.076) (0.137) (0.122)
Post-Law*World Price -0.335*** -0.148*** -0.388*** -0.148***
(0.052) (0.034) (0.044) (0.037)
ADCVD 0.196** 0.207***
(0.078) (0.068)
Constant 1.473*** 1.526*** 0.113 0.114
(0.243) (0.228) (0.449) (0.399)
Observations 84 84 84 84
R-squared 0.572 0.565 0.613 0.624
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Robustness: First-Dierence Estimation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log U.S. Log U.S. Log U.S. Log U.S.
VARIABLES Beet Price Cane Price Beet Price Cane Price
GE Law 0.020*** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.017***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008)
Pre-Law*World Price 0.015 0.146*** 0.019 0.147**
(0.047) (0.049) (0.005) (0.058)
Post-Law*World Price 0.003 0.141*** 0.007 0.143**
(0.47) (0.049) (0.052) (0.056)
ADCVD -0.002 -0.001
(0.008) (0.008)
Constant -0.009* -0.007 -0.009 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 83 83 83 83
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses; ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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